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Who Pays To Protect Native Vegetation?  Costs To Farmers In Moree 
Plains Shire, New South Wales 
 







The Native Vegetation Conservation Act was introduced on January 1
st 1998 to limit 
the clearing of native grassland and woodland in NSW.  The Act has limited clearing 
and development to crops, has protected biodiversity, and may have enhanced soil and 
water conservation.  But this analysis of the prices paid for land in Moree Plains Shire 
shows that the Act has reduced land values by some 21 per cent and has already 
reduced annual incomes by 10 per cent across the whole Shire. This reduction in annual 
incomes may well reach 18 per cent by 2005.  This decrease in income means that farm 
households in the Shire currently must give up 15.6 per cent of their household income 
because they must protect native vegetation on their farms.  In contrast, urban 
households in Australia must give up only 0.55 per cent of one per cent of their income 
through taxes for the same purpose. The Act has imposed these costs on farmers who 
are already struggling financially, has made the distribution of income in the 
community less equal, and has made farm families bear far higher costs than urban 
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  The broad goal of environmental policy is to increase the benefits to society as 
a whole from the use of Australia’s natural resources. But gains in benefits to the 
whole community are often accompanied by losses to particular groups within the 
community.  Governments therefore assess policy options against the following 
specific objectives. 
• appropriateness   is government intervention justified? 
• effectiveness    is the policy likely to achieve its objective? 
• efficiency    do the benefits of the policy exceed the costs? 
• equity  how will it affect the distribution of benefits and costs? 
The Native Vegetation Conservation Act NSW was introduced on 1
st January 
1998 to reflect the growing community concern for the future of native vegetation. 
The Act was designed to prevent inappropriate clearing, to manage the remaining 
native vegetation sustainably, to prevent further economic loss, to streamline the 
administration of native vegetation management, and to encourage landholder and 
community involvement in vegetation management (NSW Department of Land and 
Water Conservation, February 1998).   
The Act removes the farmer’s rights to clear or develop native woodland or 
native grassland, except for certain minor exemptions such as cutting seven trees per 
hectare for farm purposes. The Act then permits development on application by the 
farmer and consent from the Department of Land and Water Conservation (DLWC). 
State Environmental Planning Policy 46 (SEPP 46) had been introduced in August 
1995 with the same objectives and the same restrictions, to begin the process of policy 
formulation. 
The balance between protection and clearing will be determined through the 
Regional Vegetation Management Committees that were established under the Act.  
These committees are in the process of preparing regional vegetation management 
plans, which must identify the social and economic aspects of native vegetation 
management, and consider the economic viability of land uses (NSW Department of 
Land and Water Conservation, July 1997).  Efficiency and equity are therefore to be 
addressed at the level of the regional committee and the regional plan.  
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During the process of formulating this policy, the objectives of 
appropriateness, effectiveness, efficiency, and equity have all been recognised and 
discussed.  Government intervention was necessary to protect native vegetation, the 
policy option was likely to achieve this objective, and the planning process was to 
explicitly consider efficiency (the sum of benefits and costs) and equity (the 
distribution of benefits and costs).  Indeed, all these issues are covered in the 
underlying white paper (NSW Department of Land and Water Conservation, July 
1997) and a series of Factsheets (such as NSW Department of Land and Water 
Conservation, 1998).  They were also all covered in the many meetings sponsored by 
the DLWC to introduce the Act to farmers and the community throughout the state. 
The requirement to retain native vegetation on farms can impose several kinds 
of cost on the landholder, all of which bear on the equity objective.  The costs include 
the loss of income because use of land with native vegetation is restricted to grazing, 
and the associated loss of land value.  They also include the ongoing costs of 
maintaining on-farm conservation reserves, and all the different kinds of costs that 
accompany applications to the DLWC for consent to develop land with native 
vegetation.  Six years have passed since original SEPP 46  was introduced and so all 
these costs will have become apparent.  A formal assessment of how the Act has 
affected the distribution of costs is therefore timely, and an intensive case study 
covering the whole area of a regional vegetation management committee, is a useful 
way to do this. 
The objectives of the paper may therefore be summarised as follows:  
• to assess the loss in farm income and the loss in farm land value due to the Act, 
• to assess the importance of these losses to farm families, and 
• to assess farmers willingness to protect native vegetation in the face of these costs.  
The price that farmers actually pay for land is a measure of their expectations 
from it and reflects the whole set of values implicit in the land - - as seen by the 
farmer.  The price will therefore “capture” the immediate income earning capacity of 
the land, and any long term benefits from reductions in land degradation due to the 
retention of trees and other vegetation. Further, prices are actual measures of worth 
because they are actually paid in the market and land is the main capital asset of the 
farmer.  The analysis is therefore based on prices paid for farm land in Moree Plains 
Shire NSW.  This area has been characterised by the active clearing of native 
vegetation up to the introduction of the Act, and the environmental sensitivity of  
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many of the remaining areas of native vegetation.  The Shire is also characterised by 




  There is a rich Australian literature on policies to encourage the protection of 
native vegetation on farms, and a limited literature on the costs to farmers of 
achieving this community goal.  Both these areas are now reviewed to set the analysis 
in context.  In terms of the objectives for national policies, the writers agree that some 
kind of intervention is appropriate, and offer a wide range of potentially-effective 
policies.  But they offer far less information on the actual efficiency or equity impacts 
of their suggestions. 
 
A range of policies 
There are three broad kinds of policy to protect native vegetation, namely 
monetary incentives and disincentives, regulations to restrict farm activities and 
mandate conservation measures, and changes to the ownership of property.  They all 
address the basic issue of the decline in quantity and quality of native vegetation 
throughout rural NSW and the underlying causes of increasing rural poverty, the need 
to expand cropping, and the lack of visible economic incentives to the farmer 
(Nadolny et al (1995).  They can all provide the support that landholders need at the 
“crunch times” of land purchase, family crisis, crop failure and falling prices 
(Crosthwaite 1995).  
Monetary incentives and dis-incentives include financial assistance with 
fencing and management costs, payments for stewardship of the land, reductions to 
Shire rates, and income tax incentives.  Dobbin (2000), National Manager of the 
Primary Industries Bank of Australia, advocates interest–rate subsidies to farmers 
who adopt good farming practises.  McKay (1995), representing the Tasmanian 
Farmers and Graziers Association, promotes a wide range of monetary incentives to 
protect native vegetation.  Her policies include low interest loans, direct grants, tax 
credits for woodland management, and rebates on state land tax and shire rates for 
those who protect.  
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  Christoff (1995) and James (1997) review the use of such market-based 
policy incentives in Australia and in environmental management.  These instruments 
are increasingly being used in the economy as a whole, but they have played only a 
minor role so far in environment management.  The Standing Committee on 
Environment and Heritage (2001) highlights a reason for this minor role.  Monetary 
incentives require a long-term fund dedicated to rural conservation, but changing and 
uncertain government budgets cannot provide such funds. 
Governments have used regulations to protect endangered species of flora and 
fauna by restricting other competitive activities.  There are many circumstances where 
direct regulation is the only practical option to ensure protection.  Indeed, the 
Australian Conservation Foundation (1995) advocates that all States introduce strict 
regulations to control clearing.  But these controls pay insufficient attention to the 
nature and quality of habitat being protected and provide no incentive to improve 
degraded habitat.  They also impose unnecessary costs when a particular habitat is 
already over protected (Industry Commission, 1998). 
Regulations may provide an essential safety net to assure some minimum level 
of conservation if voluntary measures fail (Young et al 1996).  Yet as Hodge (1991) 
points out, this kind of policy may target effectiveness at the expense of the efficiency 
and equity objectives.  Administrators may know little about the situations faced by 
farmers and so impose costly constraints on them - - a problem that is being examined 
in the present paper. 
The practical and theoretical advantages of changes to property rights are 
discussed by MacAuley (1996) and Young et al (1996).  Changes can include 
covenants, conservation easements over freehold land, management agreements that 
involve clearing controls, and development of systems of tradeable development 
rights to limit development at least cost to the community.  But the cost of some kinds 
of changes can be high. Whitby and Saunders (1996) report that the costs to create 
management agreements with farmers to conserve Sites of Special Scientific Interest 
in Britain totalled some 95.7 pounds per hectare of agreement, when all the 
administrative costs and compensation to farmers were included. 
 
Choice of policies 
The choice of policies should rest on the outcomes of each on the four 
community objectives and the trade-offs between the objectives.  Policies should then  
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be chosen to provide the best set of outcomes on the set of four objectives. There are 
many difficulties with this process, and the information needs are obvious.  A major 
problem concerns the competition between objectives.  For example, policies to 
promote effectiveness may decrease efficiency or equity.  Mues, Moon and Grivas 
(1996) indicate that current taxation incentives allow accelerated depreciation on 
water storages and 100 per cent deductions on capital works for prevention of land 
degradation.  Some 40 per cent of broadacre and dairy farmers used these tax 
provisions in 1993 –1994, indicating their effectiveness. The current system therefore 
has encouraged the treatment of land degradation.  But Mues, Moon and Grivas 
(1996) showed that the biggest tax benefits went to a small group of individuals with 
the highest taxable incomes, and 10 to 20 per cent of farmers got no benefit at all.  A 
significant proportion of broadacre farmers rarely earned sufficient income to take full 
advantage of these measures, so other kinds of tax incentive such as tax rebates and 
tax credits should be explored.  The existing system would be a valuable policy when 
used in conjunction with other policies to enhance resource management. 
Young (1995) steers the debate toward the identification of trade-offs by 
arguing that biodiversity may be conserved at greater efficiency by a combination of 
government reserves and off-reserve policies to encourage changes in land-use 
practises.  He provides a reason why a mix of policies is to be preferred and the trade-
offs should be considered - - a mix of policies should lead to a set of complementary 
outcomes on the set of national objectives.  Economic policy measures in combination 
with changes to property rights, institutional arrangements, and enforceable 
regulations, can simultaneously achieve all four national objectives.   “A mixed 
approach is necessary so that all policy instruments acting in concert produce an 
efficient, equitable, dynamic, dependable and politically acceptable outcome.” 
(Young, 1992, p157). 
A mix of the three kinds of policy seems to be essential to meet the national 
objectives, and this balanced approach has many advocates.  Miles, Lockwood and 
Walpole (1998), Farrier (1995), Milham (1994), Panayotou (1992), Hodge (1991), 
and Wills (1987) have all reviewed the range of policies to protect native vegetation 
from their different perspectives.  They all seem to agree that a mix is better able to 
meet the set of community objectives.  For example, Miles, Lockwood and Walpole 
(1998) promote a package of monetary incentives (grants to pay for fencing and  
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annual management costs, tax incentives and lower shire rates) and changes to 
property rights (through binding and non-binding management agreements). 
In a comprehensive review of a wide range of current government policies, 
including compensation and payments for management, Farrier (1995) advocates a 
balance of regulations and incentive payments for management. He argues that 
government conservation reserves may satisfy domestic needs for effective 
biodiversity conservation, but international obligations require that biodiversity is also 
protected on farmland.  Bennett (1995) reviews the role of the private sector in 
protecting natural areas through the marketplace and monetary incentives.  A 
combination of private and government initiatives is better able to meet the set of 
objectives, and so a shift in government policy to allow for a greater role of the 
individuals and corporations is advisable 
Policies will inevitably interact with each other, to enhance or reduce the 
outcomes on the community’s four objectives.  The Industry Commission (1998) 
argued that much has already been done to advance the sustainable use of natural 
resources in agriculture.  But the incorporation of ecological sustainability into policy 
has been ad hoc, incomplete, piecemeal, and tentative.  Australian governments, at all 
levels, must implement a comprehensive and closely integrated set of policies to 
attempt to enhance outcomes on all objectives. 
The Australian Conservation Foundation (1995) recognised this same 
interaction when they advocated changes to Commonwealth taxation policies to 
actively reduce the encouragement for tree clearing. The Commonwealth should use 
cross-compliance measures to ensure one kind of programme complements another.  
The Commonwealth should review the effects of its funding programmes where these 
counter the effectivness of conservation laws. The Commonwealth should apply 
covenants more frequently to control land use where public funds are used, and 
should directly support local government planning through reimbursements for rate 
rebates.  
Administrative arrangements must promote the implementation of policies.   
Binning and Young (1997) offer three independent principles for designing policies to 
protect vegetation: partnerships between the people involved, costs to be shared 
amongst beneficiaries, and secure tenures to land. NSW Farmers (2000) suggest a 
policy-review process to smooth the introduction and development of policies.   
Farmers face a shrinking bottom line, increasing regulation to provide outcomes for  
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others, yet are seeking to build partnerships with other groups across the political 
spectrum to conserve bioidiversity.  Their target is to build trust between the farming 
community, governments and urban interest groups. 
 
Policies and the farmer 
  The role of farmers, who manage the land that has native vegetation, must be 
addressed explicitly.  Do they have an obligation to protect the vegetation? Do they 
have a right to compensation if they are forced to retain vegetation? To ensure 
protection of native vegetation on the farm, policies should provide feedback 
mechanisms that reward resource conservation and environmental improvement 
(Young, 1992). 
The use of financial incentives together with voluntary protection may suit the 
farmer but does not guarantee protection.  If protection is to be assured, the 
community must devise incentives to reward the farmer for doing so.  Hanley et al 
(1995) studied principles for the supply of environmental amenities from farmland, in 
nine countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
They found that a large proportion of the governments pay farmers to provide 
amenities from agriculture and rural land use in general, and few ask the beneficiaries 
to pay.  To obtain these payments, farmers must follow certain guidelines and 
restrictions, as for example, reductions in herbicide use, maintenance of stone walls, 
and establishment of broad-leaved woodland plantations. Some of the schemes 
include: 
•   the North American Water-fowl Management Plan funded by taxpayers in the 
United States of America and Canada, 
•  the National Fund for the Protection of Rural Landscapes in Switzerland. Similar 
schemes exist in Sweden, Ireland, the Netherlands and Austria, and 
•  the Environmentally Sensitive Areas scheme and Management Agreements under 
the Wildlife and Countryside Act in the United Kingdom. 
The principle of incentive payments to farmers who produce environmental 
goods is well established in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development. The principle of voluntary production of these goods, as opposed to 
mandatory production, is also well established. The United Kingdom, for example, 
has preferred the voluntary approach with monetary incentives and has avoided 
uncompensated regulations to preserve woodland.  Cary (1995) applies these lessons  
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to Australia.  The impetus for such programmes in Europe comes from active urban 
concern for the state of rural landscapes and the viability of disadvantaged rural 
communities. “Such concerns need to be fostered in Australia as a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for public funding contributions for more active maintenance of 
vegetation on private land.” (Cary, op cit p 44). 
  The landholders’ viewpoints on policies to protect native vegetation have 
been well represented in New South Wales. NSW Farmers (2000) argues that the 
provision of public-good outcomes by the landholder should be accompanied by 
appropriate measures to offset the costs. They acknowledge farmers do and should 
have a duty of care to protect the environment, but protection beyond this level should 
trigger public funding to ensure equity within the community (NSW Farmers. 2001).  
This issue of compensation may have to be addressed more formally to meet 
efficiency and equity objectives.  The community may feel that farmers may have an 
entitlement to their reference income, if they follow the perceptions of households in 
a surveys undertaken by Kahneman, Knetsch and Tversky (1986).  This income is 
their earnings at a given reference point, which presumably would be the years 
immediately prior to the introduction of a change such as the Act.   Hodge (1989) 
suggests that compensation may be justified when farmers face a change in their 
reference point to meet a new set of responsibilities to provide environmental services 
for the public. 
 
Costs to farmers 
The benefits and costs from the protection of native vegetation provide the 
necessary information to judge the contribution of policies on the efficiency and 
equity objectives.  The benefits of retaining vegetation are hard to measure.  But the 
assessment of costs, even just to those who provide the environmental services, 
remains useful information to judge outcomes on the equity objective. 
In a comprehensive benefit-cost analysis of retention of native vegetation in 
southern NSW and northern Victoria, Lockwood and Walpole (1999) assessed the 
different kinds of costs to farmers.  The cost of retention in NSW (40 year scenario, 4 
per cent discount rate) was allocated as follows. Thirty-eight per cent comprised 
direct costs of management such as fencing, 24 per cent was the opportunity cost of 
lost income because farmers are unable to develop to pasture or crops, and 38 per cent 
was the loss of benefits elsewhere on the property.  While these costs totalled $66.5 as  
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a net present value, the benefits to the community and the local catchment were even 
higher.  Protection of this native vegetation met the efficiency objective, even though 
farmers bore the costs to provide environmental benefits for others. 
 Middleton et al (1999) estimated the loss in income imposed by the Act on 
landholders in three shires in Northern New South Wales.  Much freehold woodland 
remains on the south and western parts of Walcha Shire near the eastern fall.  If this 
woodland must be protected, landholders will forego income they could otherwise 
have earned by clearing and developing to pasture for livestock.  But 65 per cent of 
the sample would in fact lose nothing because they did not wish to develop, and 
another 10 per cent would lose between $1 and $50 per ha. Overall, a large proportion 
would lose little while a small proportion lose considerable amounts. 
Scott (1998) and Brosnan (1999) both analysed the costs of the restrictions of 
the native vegetation conservation acts on individual properties.  In the Hunter Valley 
of New South Wales, Scott found that the restrictions of the Native Vegetation 
Conservation Act reduced annual incomes by some seven per cent on a 810 ha 
property with 230 ha of native woodland of various types and slopes.  If the same 
restrictions were in place in southern Queensland, losses in annual income would vary 
between 10 and 14 per cent on a pastoral property of 16 700 ha in the western Darling 
Downs where 11 100 ha are still in woodland of various kinds.  
The value of livestock output in the Gunnedah area of northern New South 
Wales is at a maximum when 34 per cent of the farm is under tree cover (Walpole, 
1999).  Gross value of output increases up to this point and decreases thereafter.  A 
similar trend has been reported for the northern tablelands of New South Wales 
(Sinden and Jones, 1985).  Income from livestock output increased with increasing 
amounts of live tree cover up to a maximum, but decreased as the quantity of live tree 
cover increased thereafter. 
Eucalypt dieback, which cleared the woodland on well-wooded grazing 
properties in Walcha, Uralla and Dumaresq Shires on the northern tablelands of 
NSW, increased farm incomes in total by $1.7m per year. As Tisdell (1984) says, this 
does not imply that it is economic to allow the dieback and clearance of trees.  Rather, 
the increase in farm income must be weighed against the loss in benefits from 
clearing. Do the loss of biodiversity, increase in land degradation, and lower water 
quality that follow dieback, cost the community even more than $1.7m per year?  But  
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the estimation of the costs of retaining native vegetation is the first step in this 
discussion. 
The relationships of land value with native woodland in NSW have been 
explored in the southern border areas, Liverpool Plains, and Northern Tablelands.  
Walpole (2000) analysed sales of 124 farms spanning southern NSW and northeast 
Victoria.  She observed that many factors affect the price paid for farmland. She 
found that size of property, presence of a house, fences with good condition and 
placement, and purchase of an additional property all significantly raised the price 
that was paid.  But the influence of native vegetation could not be definitively 
identified. 
In his role as a land valuer, Spackman (2000) compared recent individual sales 
of cleared-and-cultivated properties and uncleared grassland properties in the 
Liverpool Plains.  A hectare of cultivated land typically sold for $600 more than a 
hectare of land with native grasses that had to be retained under the Act.  Protection of 
native vegetation lowers land values in this area. 
The dieback of eucalypts in on the Northern Tablelands in the 1970s and 
1980s led to increases in the value of farmland (Sinden, Jones, and Fleming, 1983).  
There was still some 16 per cent of the property covered in healthy native woodland.  
Land value increased with decreases in the quantity of live trees, and with increases in 
the percentage of woodland with advanced dieback in scattered trees.  But land value 
increased with the variety of species in the remaining live trees remaining, with 
decreases in altitude, and with closeness to a town.   Buyers were balancing, inter alia, 
the increased income from a larger grazing area and the benefits of retaining a variety 
of species in the remaining live woodland. 
 
Method 
Governments formulate policies in terms of the objectives of appropriateness, 
effectiveness, efficiency and equity.  The present study concerns just the equity 
objective, with an intensive case study to measure the effects of the Native Vegetation 
Conservation Act NSW on the distributions of income. To assess these effects, we 





Principles and criteria for equity 
Economics, and the other social sciences, have developed several principles to 
judge the desirability of distributions of benefits and costs. None of these principles, 
or the criteria to apply them, are fully satisfactory and there are options and 
ambiguities in specifying the criterion criteria (Page, 1997). But each of the principles 
offers a basis to judge the desirability of changes, and each is a used particular 
contexts.  They are described here in terms of both welfare (better off or worse off) 
and monetary income.  They are used to compare changes in distribution with respect 
to the current distribution and not with respect to some minimum desirable levels of 
income. 
Protect, in fact, levels of welfare of all individuals (Pareto criterion)  A policy is 
desirable if it makes one or more people better off, without actually making anyone 
else worse off. 
Protect, potentially, levels of welfare of all individuals (Kaldor-Hicks criterion) A 
policy is desirable if the gainers could potentially compensate all the potential losers 
and still be better off.  
Improve the distribution of welfare to selected groups (Rawls criterion) A policy is 
desirable if it redistributes income to selected groups in society, such as the sick, the 
poor, or future generations (Rawls, 1971). 
Improve the distribution of welfare to the whole community - - to make people more 
equal (Lorenz criterion) A policy is desirable if it makes the income of everyone in 
the community more equal.   
Improve the distribution of welfare to the whole community- - to make people more 
equal without making any group worse off (Constrained Lorenz criterion)  A policy is 
desirable if it makes the income of everyone in the community more equal without 
decreasing the income of any individual group. 
To many, the concept of equality and Lorenz’ principles are adequate and 
reasonable grounds for judging the issues of equity. Two guidelines have been 
developed to apply these egalitarian principles and compare distributions of benefits 
and costs. 
•  Treat equals equally (horizontal equity)  A policy is desirable when people on equal 
income are treated equally.  With respect to protection of native vegetation, the 
criterion is met when people on the same income receive the same benefit or pay the  
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same cost of protection.  The criterion is violated if people with similar income levels 
in different parts of the state receive different net benefits or pay different costs. 
•  Improve minimum levels of welfare (vertical equity)  A policy is desirable if it 
makes one or more people better off without disadvantaging those in society who are 
already worst off.  Vertical equity concerns the treatment of unequals. If the benefits 
or costs of a policy are distributed in proportion to income, the distribution is said to 
be proportional. If the poor receive a larger share of the benefits (or pay a smaller 
share of the costs), the policy is progressive - - and so desirable.   But if the poor pay 
a larger share of the costs (or receive a smaller share of the benefits), the policy is 
regressive - - and so undesirable. Conventionally, regressive policies violate the 
vertical equity criterion.   
The Lorenz principle, that more-equal distributions are better distributions, 
provides an egalitarian basis to judge the incidence of benefits and costs.  But a caveat 
is in order.  These concepts of fairness and equity are used in a “conditional” sense.  
A policy that meets this equity objective is desirable, because we have followed the 
Lorenz principle of fairness and the notion of egalitarianism.  In this context, policies 
that violate horizontal equity, and regressive policies of vertical equity, are both 
unfair and undesirable because they decrease equity.  These two criteria can readily 
be used to assess the distributional impacts of introducing a new policy on a given 
group of people, as in the present study.  
 
Measures of income 
Gross margin, net farm income, and return to capital invested in the land are 
three, standard, complementary measures of annual farm income. Gross margin per 
hectare (GMPH) is defined as: 
GMPH = Gross money revenue – variable money costs      (1) 
 
In the case of crops for example, the variable costs include expenditures on seed, 
fertiliser and fuel.  Net farm income (NETINC) or farm business profit is defined as: 
 
NETINC = Gross margin – fixed costs – depreciation – return to capital – owners salary     (2) 
 
The return to capital is the rate of interest on a loan if capital is borrowed to 
purchase the land, or the foregone interest if the capital were available but could have 
invested elsewhere.  The return is set at 8 per cent, which reflects the rate at which  
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many of the farmers were borrowing.  The owner’s salary was set at $80 000 per year, 
an estimate of the potential earnings in alternative employment such as the public 
service or business.  
The return to the land (RETL) is defined as: 
 
RETL =  (Gross margin – fixed costs - depreciation – owners salary)/(Price paid 
for land) expressed as a percentage          (3) 
  
The farm business is profitable if RETL exceeds the loan rate of eight per cent 
All three measures of profit were assessed for a “good” year, using the 
farmers’ best prices and yields from the last three years (1998, 1999, and 2000).  They 
were also assessed for 2000, a bad year in the Shire. An average income over the 
three years was estimated from the local maxim that “two bad years follow every 
good year”.  The main results are set in terms of a good year to present a strong test 
on the equity criteria. 
 
Data Collection 
Choice of study area 
Farm land in Moree Plains Shire is characterised by extensive clearing of 
native vegetation (up until recently), the diversity of agriculture, and the 
environmental sensitivity of many of the remaining areas of native vegetation.  The 
farm land market is in the Shire very active and between August 1995 and December 
2000, 370 parcels of land exchanged.  Of this total, some 180 were exchanges of land 
between different farm families and the remainder were exchanges involving business 
companies with headquarters in a state capital, transfers within a family, and 
purchases of closed roads.  The study focussed on farm families who had bought land 
from other farm families, since the original restrictions were introduced under SEPP 
46 in August 1995. The first 51 of the buyers, with whom appointments could be 
made, were interviewed to obtain data on prices, yields, costs, areas of different kinds 
of vegetation, and other farm characteristics. All the buyers in this sample lived on 
their properties, and their farms were their main source of income.  They were 
scattered widely across the Shire and are considered representative of family owned 





The price paid for land (LVALUE) was expressed per hectare in the dollars of 
December 2000.  Data were obtained from the Valuer-General on all exchanges of 
land in the Shire since January 1991.  Since that time, prices had been rising steadily 
at eight per cent per year, so the prices paid were inflated at this annual rate to the 
common date of December 2000.  The area of the purchased land was expressed in 
hectares (AREA). The distance from the nearest large town, Moree Narrabri, or 
Goondiwindi, was a measure of the residential amenity of the purchase (DIST). 
Following standard definitions, native forest was defined as woodland where 
the tree canopy covered more than 20 per cent of the ground. Native woodland was 
defined as vegetation where tree canopy covered less than 20 per cent.  The farmers 
estimated the percentages of their purchase under native forest, native woodland, 
native grassland which had not been cultivated in the last 10 years, native grassland 
that had been cultivated in the last ten years, and land in cultivation - - all at the time 
of purchase.  These characteristics provided useful descriptions of the farms, and 
information for the following two variables for the analysis of land prices. 
OCACT was the average loss in gross margin due to the Act, calculated per hectare 
over the whole area of the purchase.  The loss occurs, of course, because the farmers 
could not develop their native forest, native woodland, or native grassland which had 
not been cultivated in the last 10 years.  The values were calculated with each farmers 
preferred enterprise mix, with his good prices yields and costs.  
SUSTAIN  was a measure of the capacity of cropland for sustained production. A 
scale of 1 (very incapable) to 5 (very capable) was described in terms of factors such 
as the prevention of sheet erosion of soil due to floods, the need for fertiliser 
application, and for weed control. Native vegetation is very effective in the Shire in 
reducing soils erosion from floods and may be effective in the longer term in reducing 
other kinds of land degradation.  The chosen rating was multiplied by the percentage 
of the purchase under crops and itself expressed as a percentage.   
 
Results 
A context in which to assess equity 
  The current distribution of income within the sample provides the context in 
which to assess the impacts of the Native Vegetation Conservation Act. Current  
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incomes are, of course, affected by the Act.  The three measures of income were first 
calculated for each farm for a good year and the 51 farms were ordered by their 
percentage return to land (RETL).  The farms were then aggregated from the ranking 
into ten groups, and the mean value of each of the three measures was calculated per 
group (Table 1). 
The average return to land for the whole sample (8.4 per cent) only just 
exceeded the costs of borrowing (7 to 8 per cent).  In a good year therefore, with the 
farmers’ own expectations of yields, costs, and prices, and under the present 
provisions of the Act, farmers are only just breaking even.  Farmers in the lowest two 
income groups all earn negative returns to the land, and farmers in the lowest five 
groups all earn less than the cost of borrowing capital -- so the net incomes (column 
3) of the lowest five groups are all negative.  Overall then, half the farmers are losing 
net income even in a good year. 
The average value of each measure was also calculated for the year 2000, 
when yields and many prices were poor due to two floods throughout most of this 
very flat Shire.  In 2000, the average return to land was –1.5 per cent, the average net 
income was –$83 per ha, and the average gross margin was $28 per hectare.  If good 
years are one in three, and the two bad years follow the 2000 data, the average return 
to land is 1.8 per cent (the average of 8.4, -1.5, and –1.5 per cent).  Similarly the 
average net income is –$54 per hectare (the average of +$5, -$83 and –$83).  These 
results may be summarised as follows. 
  Kind of year  Return to land 
% 
Net income  
$ per ha 
Gross margin   
$ per ha 
 Good  8.4  5  $125 
 Average  1.8  -54  60 
 Bad  -1.5  -83  28 
On this basis, the two conventional economic indicators of net earnings (return 
to land and net income) suggest that farming across the Shire is unprofitable - - 
farmers are struggling financially.  
 
The problem of equity between farm types 
The mean values of the basic farm characteristics and the measures of income 
are summarised in Table 2 for the overall sample, and for three types of farm. The 
differences between farms may be summarised as follows.  
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• The average price paid for land was $793 per hectare.  The price paid by cotton 
farmers was about double that paid by grain farmers, and almost three times that paid 
by livestock farmers. 
• The differences in prices paid for land between farm types directly reflects the 
differences in gross margin and net farm income. 
• The opportunity cost of the Act is $55 per hectare, 44 per cent of the annual gross 
margin, and this cost falls most heavily on the livestock farmers. 
The restrictions on land use, and the reasons for these opportunity costs 
imposed by the Act, may be illustrated as follows.  In a good year, sustainable grazing 
of grassland might yield a gross margin of $15 - 30 per hectare whereas development 
to crops might yield a gross margin of $200 - 250. The Act restricts this clearing and 
development of native vegetation, and so reduces the farmer’s gross margin by $185 
to $220 per hectare.  But further constraints on grazing, to follow strict conservation 
guidelines, might restrict earnings from grazing of grassland to $1 - $10 per hectare - 
- in a good year.  These constraints lead to higher  reductions in income. 
The difficulties that are created by the current distribution of native vegetation 
may be summarised as follows. 
• Distribution of remaining vegetation is uneven between farm types, so the impact of 
the Act is uneven. 
• The opportunity cost of the Act for livestock farmers, measured as foregone income 
is more than double that for grain or cotton farmers. 
• Most remaining vegetation is associated with livestock farming, so the livestock 
farmers are affected worst. 
Several of the farmers in each of the three groups had applied for consent to 
clear and crop areas of native vegetation.  In all cases, their applications had been 
denied or the requested area had been reduced in size.  The livestock farmers are most 
affected (they have the highest opportunity cost) and are least able to bear the cost 
(they have the poorest income). They have more native vegetation, where clearing is 
restricted, so the Act impacts more heavily on the poorest farmers. 
 
Impacts of vegetation protection on the price paid for land 
The literature, and information collected to formulate the problem, suggested 
that the price that farmers would pay for land would vary with short term profits 
(GMPH), size of purchase (AREA), long-term sustainability of cropland (SUSTAIN),  
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distance from a town (DIST), and the opportunity costs of the Act (OCACT). The 
influence of these variables on price paid was determined by estimating the following 
equation from the data for all 51 farms. 
 
  LVALUE = f(GMPH, AREA, SUSTAIN, DIST and OCACT)    (4) 
 
There are several ways to specify this function, and the most appropriate was 
determined through econometric tests of goodness of fit.  The function was estimated 
with each specification and the explanatory powers of each were compared through 
the adjusted R squared, F, and t statistics.  On this basis, the simple arithmetic 
function was used, but AREA was converted to natural logarithms to capture the 
expected curvilinear relationship of price with size of the purchase. The estimated 
form of this function was: 
 
LVALUE =   3.904 + 2.412 GMPH – 75.415 AREA + 1.949 SUSTAIN 
    (3.9)     (5.7)***       (1.9)**           (1.5)* 
 
 – 1.893 DIST – 0.749 OCACT                  (5) 
         (1.6)**      (1.3)* 
 
The adjusted R squared statistic was 0.714, the F statistic was 25.942 and the t 
statistics are shown in parentheses.  All the variables were statistically significant in 
explaining variations in the price paid. The superscript *** indicates significance on 
the t statistic at one per cent or better, ** indicates significance at five per cent or 
better, and * indicates significance at 10 per cent or better.  The signs on the variables 
indicate that price paid varies in the following manner: 
  •  an increase in annual gross margin increases the price paid, 
•  an increase in size of the purchase reduces the price paid, 
• an increase in the sustainability of cropland increases the price paid, 
• an increase in the distance from town reduces the price paid, and 
• an increase in the opportunity cost of the Act decreases the price paid. 
This latter result indicates that the Act has reduced the price paid for land, throughout 
the sample - - and hence throughout the Shire.  The Native Vegetation Conservation 
Act has therefore led to a reduction in land value.  Lower prices reduce the role of land 
as collateral for a loan, and the restrictions of the Act make the land harder to sell.  
Lower prices may also reduce the ability of the Shire to raise rate income.  
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But how important is this opportunity cost imposed by the Act and how large is 
the associated change in price paid for land?   The relative importance is shown by the 
levels of significance of the variables in equation (5).  The opportunity cost of the Act 
(OCACT) is the least important of the five variables (significant at 10 per cent) while 
gross margin (GMPH) is the most important (significant at one per cent). The actual 
importance, or actual magnitudes, of the impacts is shown by the coefficients of the 
model: 
• a $10 gain in income, from a $10 rise in GMPH, increases price paid by $24.1 , and 
• a $10 gain in income, from a $10 fall in OCACT, increases price paid by $7.5 per ha.  
Thus, the effect of the Act on price is only some third the effect of gross 
margin. The $10 gains are of course identical increases in income, but they translate 
into very different changes in the price paid.  Farmers are valuing a gain in net income 
from an increase in gross margin much more highly than the same gain from the lower 
opportunity cost.  The former is a relatively certain gain but  the latter is an unlikely 
gain unless consent is granted to develop the land.  The difference (24.1 to 7.5) is a 
measure of the discount farmers place on the uncertain gains from the consent process. 
  If we assume that these results can be expanded arithmetically, we can 
calculate the following results from the equation (5).  
 
Scenario: with or 








$ per ha 
Loss 
in land value   
%  
With:  as at present  up to 59  41  793  0 
Without:  scenario 1   80 20  941  20.4 
Without:  scenario 2  85 15  949  21.3 
For the “Without: scenario 1” for example, the land value would be 20.4 per 
cent higher without the Act, and so the Act has led to a loss in land value of 20.4 per 
cent. 
  Both sustainability of cropland and the opportunity costs of the Act were 
significant in the model, and both result from the retention of native vegetation. 
Buyers pay more for land on which cropping is more sustainable, and the level of 
sustainability relates partly to the retention of native vegetation.  Retention therefore 
has a role in enhancing land values.  Buyers pay less for land that has a higher 
proportion of native vegetation.  Retention of native vegetation therefore has a role in  
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reducing land values. Buyers of land are therefore balancing the benefits and costs of 
retaining native vegetation. 
 
Impacts of vegetation protection on farm income.   
  Unless specific consent has been granted to develop the land, the Act will 
reduce income because uses are restricted to grazing native grassland and native 
woodland - - instead of the more profitable cropping.  So farmers bear a direct loss of 
income from the protection of native vegetation.  But what is the magnitude of this 
loss over the whole farm? 
    The size of the loss was estimated by comparing the existing gross margin 
with the Act to potential gross margins without the Act (Table 3).  The average gross 
margin, at present with the Act, was $125 per hectare, using yields, prices and costs 
for each farm in a good year (Table 2).  The same prices and costs were then used to 
estimate gross margins without the Act and with further restrictions under the Act.  As 
at December 2000, 59.1 per cent of the land in the sample could be cultivated under 
the Act, because it was already under cultivation (42.2 per cent) or had been native 
grassland for less than 10 years (16.9 per cent).  
Between 1985 and 1994 clearing of woody vegetation had been proceeding in 
the Shire at a rate of 1.12 per cent a year (Cox, Sivertsen and Bedward, 2001).  If this 
compound rate were to have continued from August 1995 to December 2000, another 
7.8 per cent of the area of woody vegetation (or 22 ha) would have been cleared to 
crops. If we assume that native grassland would have been developed at the same rate, 
another 22 ha would be under crops - - for a total of 44 extra ha that could be 
cultivated.  The total area of cultivatable land would increase to 62 per cent of the 
average property across the whole Shire.  The authors suggest their rate is an under-
estimate, so we assume that 65 per cent could now be cultivated.  The average gross 
margin over the whole farm (Scenario 3 in Table 3) would have therefore risen from 
$125 to $137 in 2000 - -  a 10 per cent increase.  The gross margin has been decreased 
by the Act by $12 per hectare, or $20.4m across the Shire as a whole. 
By 2005, clearing would have increased the area that could be cultivated to 70 
per cent, following the same trends.  The table shows that gross margin would have 
risen to $147 per hectare - - an 18 per cent increase over the existing situation with the 
Act.  The gross margin would then have been decreased by the Act by $22 per 
hectare, or $37.4 million across the shire as a whole.  
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Further restrictions will reduce incomes again.  For example, further 
restrictions to 20 per cent protection, 40 per cent grazing, and 40 per cent cropping, 
will reduce income by another 29 per cent if they are administered uniformly across 
the properties. 
 
Costs of protection to farm and urban households 
The average gross margin for a good year appears to have been reduced by 10 
per cent because of the Act (Table 3), so farmers were contributing 10 per cent of 
their gross margin to protect native vegetation.    How does this compare to the 
contribution from urban households?   
The total income to the farm household in a good year is the $80 000 allowed 
for the owner’s salary plus payments to other family labour (which averaged $20 000 
from half a year at $40 000 per year) plus the net income from the farm (which 
averaged $6965, from $5 per ha over 1393ha).  The total household income is 
therefore $106 965 - - in a good year.  The loss of gross margin due to the Act for the 
farm as a whole is $16 716 (12 per hectare*1393) which is 15.6 per cent of this 
estimate of household income.  
An equivalent urban household, of 1.5 adult employees would earn 1.5*the 
full time adult weekly earnings of $839.2, or a total of $65 458 per year.  The national 
expenditure from household, government and industrial sources on biodiversity 
protection and conservation of soil and water was $108 per head in 1995-96.  If there 
are 3.5 people in the family, the contribution per family is $361 per year or 0.5 of one 
per cent of family income.  The farm family contribution of 15.6 per cent of 
household income is 31 times more than this estimate of the urban household 
contribution. 
  
Discussion and conclusions 
Impacts of vegetation protection on equity 
The introduction of the Native Vegetation Conservation Act in NSW appears 
to have reduced farm land values by some 20 - 21 per cent, and already reduced 
annual farm gross margins by at least 10 per cent on each hectare across Moree Plains 
Shire.  By 2005, the Act may will have reduced annual gross margins by 18 per cent - 
- if current trends continue. These costs are borne unevenly, because the highest costs 
from the Act seem to fall on the poorest farmers.  Farming is unprofitable in the Shire,  
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so these costs have been imposed on a group in the community who are already in a 
very low income class.  Further, farm households pay 31 times more for protection of 
native vegetation than urban households. 
The Act has therefore aggravated an equity situation that already needed 
improvement.  The distribution of incomes from the Act makes people in the 
community less equal and makes a poor group even poorer - - violating the two 
Lorenz principles and a natural sense of equality.  In more detail, costs are imposed 
on those who are already earning negative incomes so vertical equity is violated, and 
farmers are treated differently so horizontal equity is violated as well.  The situation is 
further aggravated because the Act imposes certain costs on farmers today to provide 
uncertain benefits at uncertain times in the future to others in the community. 
 
Willingness of farmers to protect 
Yet there remains a substantial willingness amongst the farmers to protect 
native vegetation, and so all the responses to the Act and to vegetation loss need to be 
considered.  First, the opportunity costs of the Act were least significant of the five 
variables that affect prices paid for land.  Second, these opportunity costs had a 
smaller absolute impact on land prices than gross margin.  Third, farmers who buy 
land are balancing the benefits and cost of retaining native vegetation.  They pay more 
for land on which cropping is more sustainable, and the level of sustainability relates 
partly to the retention of native vegetation.  Retention therefore has a role in 
enhancing land values. They pay less for land that has a higher proportion of native 
vegetation.  Retention of native vegetation therefore has a role in reducing land 
values. 
  Fourth, farmers clearly consider the long-term sustainability of 
cultivated land (SUSTAIN) as well as the short term profits (GMPH), when they buy 
land.  This long-term view helps to capture the benefits of retaining native vegetation. 
Fifth, and perhaps most important, many farmers appear to have an innate 
“duty of care”, and so to have already implemented a recent recommendation from 
the Standing Committee on Heritage and the Environment (2001) to integrate such a 
duty into national policies.  Farmers were asked whether they would wish to develop 
their native vegetation in the coming years.  Thirty of the 51 in the sample were happy 
to retain at least 15 per cent of their native vegetation. The other 21 wished to retain 
the option to develop at least part of their native vegetation - - they might not clear  
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and develop at all, but they needed to retain the option to do so.  These attitudes 
toward protection had an economic basis. 
 
 
                 Gross margin      Percentage 
        $  per  ha  native  vegetation 
The 30 who are willing to protect           50     29.8 
The whole sample of 51            125    40.9 
The 21 who wish to retain the option to develop   96     59.6 
Those who are willing to protect have the highest gross margin per hectare and 
the least native vegetation on their property, and so are those best able to do so 
economically.  Those who wish to retain the option to develop have gross margins 
which are considerably lower than average.  
This general willingness to protect native vegetation in Moree Plans Shire 
follows the general trend for protection of on-farm natural resources across all crop 
farms in the country.  In an extensive ABARE survey, Mues, Roper and Ockerby 
(1994) found that 34 per cent of all crop farmers plant trees and shrubs, 22 per cent 
exclude stock from areas affected by land degradation, 72 per cent use a conservative 
stocking rate, and 85 per cent manage crop rotations to minimise degradation.  These 
responses from farmers were based on the farmers’ own perceptions, and were not 
checked against such baselines as underlying carrying capacity. But they do indicate a 
substantial willingness across all crop farmers to manage the land to protect its natural 
resources. 
 
Offsets to promote equity: part of the required policy mix 
  If the present regulations continue, or if new regulations impose further 
opportunity costs on the farmer, the case for compensation must be addressed in some 
way.  But monetary compensation for all disadvantaged farmers is unlikely to be 
available.  Fortunately perhaps, the farmers are very interested in the idea of offsets or 
specific activities that provide a gain for the environment and an improvement in the 
options for farm management.  The survey contained the following two questions, set 




“   Would you voluntarily dedicate land primarily to nature conservation, with limited 
grazing, no tree thinning no clearing or cropping?”  The answers were: 
 
 
Yes Probably  Possibly  Probably  not  No  Total 
23  2 7 1  18  51 
 
The 23 who said yes, includes at least 8 who have already conserved large 
proportions of their land.  Another question concerned dedication of land with some 
kind of compensation or off-set. 
“  Would you be prepared to dedicate land in this way, if it enabled you to have 
clearing rights over another part of the property?”  The answers were: 
 
Yes Probably  Possibly  Probably  not  No  Total 
33  3 4 1  10  51 
 
These results indicate that there is widespread support for dedication of land to 
conservation of native vegetation, and the support increases if there is some equity off-
set such as permission to clear elsewhere.  But perhaps most interesting of all was the 
variety of kinds of offset that the farmers themselves suggested.  The long and varied 
list of Table 4 shows a considerable interest by farmers in the idea.  The Native 
Vegetation Conservation Act does appear to impose imposes costs on the farmer and 
to reduce land values.  The offsets would be a practical way to address these 
substantial questions of equity. 
 
An overview 
In conclusion, we now return to the objectives of a national policy, namely 
appropriateness, effectiveness, efficiency, and equity.  The literature, the farmers and 
agency personnel, all agree that government intervention was appropriate to protect 
native vegetation - - although not all the groups believe that the Native Vegetation 
Conservation Act was the best way to achieve this objective.  The Act has been 
effective in reducing the clearing of native vegetation from 6724 ha per year in 1985-
1994 to 3517 ha per year since 1998 (Cox, Sivertsen and Bedward, 2001).  The 
efficiency objective would be met too if the annual benefits throughout the community  
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from vegetation protection in the Shire exceeded the annual costs to farmers in the 
Shire (the costs are $20.4m in 2000, rising to $37.4m in 2005).  But the Act has 
aggravated equity because farm families have had to bear far higher costs than urban 
families, the distributions of income in the community are made less equal, and costs 




I should like to thank the 51 farmers and their wives who gave their time so 
readily to complete the interviews and to show me around their properties.  Andrew 
Yates, one of my students who lives in the Shire, helped with six critically-located 
interviews.  Mr L F Boland and Mr W J Yates, farmers in the Shire, helped throughout 
the project and particularly with comments on the results as they were obtained.  The 
staff of the Department of Land and Water Conservation in the Moree, Inverell, and 
Tamworth offices, were professional and helpful throughout the project.  The 
conclusions, opinions, errors, and interpretations in this paper are of course my own.  
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Table 1    Farm incomes in a good year, by three measures of income* 
 




Net income $ 
per ha 
Gross margin 
$ per ha 
1 2 3 4 
 
1 (Lowest)  -8.9  -129  81 
2 -1.7  -47 30 
3 1.4  -44  54 
4 5.3  -21  112 
5 7.5 -4  112 
6 9.6  17  142 
7 12.5  45 153 
8 15.8  66 228 
9 17.0  77 196 
10 (highest)  23.3  78  143 
Averages  8.4%  $5 per ha  $125 per ha 
 
*   The 51 farms are aggregated by return to land into groups of five, but with six in 




Table 2    The problem of equity between farm types 
 







Number of farms  51  6  27  18 
The farm as a whole 
Average area       ha  1393  1307  1155  1777 
Purchase price
c   $ per ha  793  1459  799  561 
Distance from a town  kms  63  54  60  70 
Measures of income 
Gross margin $ per ha   125  254  132  73 
Net farm income $ per ha  6  25  13  -11 
Return to land   %  8.4  8.0  10.6  5.2 
Characteristics of the vegetation 
% native grassland  19.9  15.1  11.3  34.3 
% native woodland and forest  21.0  11.2  17.2  30.0 
total % native vegetation 
d  40.9 26.3  28.5  64.3 
        
% that can be cultivated  59.1  73.7  71.5  35.7 
Total percentage  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
        
Opportunity cost of Act $ p ha  55 37  38  88 
Sustainability cropland % scale  45 71  54  23 
 
a   These farms produce mainly cotton, with grain crops also on some of them. 
b   These farms include those with livestock only, and those with livestock and crops. 
c   The purchase price is the price paid per ha,  in the dollars of December 2000. 
d  The percentage native vegetation is the sum of the percentage of native grassland 





Table 3    Changes in gross margin with and without the Act 
 













in GM*  
Potential gross margins without the Act 
1  10 10 80 100  167  +34 
2  15 15 70 100  147  +18 
3  18 17 65 100  137  +10 
        
Existing  21 20 59 100  125 0 
        
Potential gross margins with further restrictions 
4  20 30 50 100  108  -14 
5  20 40 40 100  88  -29 
6  30 40 30 100  68  -46 
 
* All changes are calculated from the existing percentage of land uses to the new 




Table 4    Suggestions for offsets, from the farmers themselves 
 
 
  Gain for native vegetation  Offset for farmer: permission to… 
On the farm 
1  Plant trees in belts  Clear and cultivate elsewhere 
2  Plant native trees on boundaries  Clear elsewhere 
3  Keep clumps and strips of trees on 
boundaries 
Clear individual trees elsewhere 
4  Keep native grass on part of the property  Crop on another part of the farm 
5  Let poorer soil go back to nature  Crop on better soil 
6  Retain woodland on hilly part of farm  Thin out native woodland near creek, to 
manage woodland properly 
    
7  Dedicate to conservation freehold land 
with endangered wildlife 
Continue to graze the area 
8  Dedicate to conservation freehold land 
with endangered wildlife 
Clear another part of the property 
9  Dedicate to conservation freehold land 
with endangered wildlife 
Intensify production elsewhere, and 
receive compensation for any net loss 
10  Dedicate to conservation freehold land 
with endangered wildlife 
Receive compensation as some % of lost 
land value 
    
Between farms 
11  Manage vegetation in adjacent TSR  Clear on part of adjacent property 
12  Keep native vegetation in one parish  Crop in another parish 
13  Keep vegetation in one shire  Clear in another shire 
    
 
 